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COOPERATIVE THEORY: 
A REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE! 
The purpoae 0£ thia paper ia to review the baaic economic 
Modela uaed to analyze cooperative organizationa. 
i111portantly the paper attempta to aaaiat the reader in 
undere.tandin9 0£ how cooperativea are either like or unlike 
inveator-owned buaineaaea. I£ cooperativea are di££erent, what 
are the i•plicationa 0£ theae di££erencea to MeJ11ber-patrona, 
boarda 0£ directora and manage111ent? 
Thia paper haa three •aJor aectiona. Contained in the £irat 
aection ia a brie£ inquiry into why cooperative theory ia 
i1nportant and a review 0£ ita relatively brie£ hiatory. The 
aecond aection ia a theoretical analyaia 0£ cooperative conduct 
and per£or111ance in varioua Market atructurea. The ·baaic economic 
11\odela £requently uaed to analyze proceaaing and aupply 
cooperativea are diacuae.ed. Theae •odela are then uaed to analyze 
the implications 0£ declining coata and open memberahip to 
cooperative conduct and per£ormance. Finally, the third section 
ia an overview 0£ game theory aa it haa been applied to 
cooperativea and aummarizee. the maJor iMplicationa 0£ thia branch 
0£ economic theory to the organization and maintenance 0£ viable 
cooperativea. 
Cooperet• Meneg•••nt end Orgenizetionel Iaauea 
Cooperative theory ia uaed in the paper to examine a number 
0£ cooperative management and organizational iaauea. Member-
patrona, manager a and boarda 0£ directora Muat atte•pt to 
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deal with theae iaauea and i•ple•ent buaineaa atrategiea. Frolft 
the perapective 0£ aociety, an evaluation 111uat be •ade whether 
cooperativea reault in conduct and per£or•ance deeaed deairable 
by aociet.y. What. are the organizational and manage•ent iaauea 
that need to be examined? 
Are cooperat.ivea .. Juat. like .. inveator-orient.ed £irma <IOF>? 
I£ cooperat.ivea are £ound to be .. Juat like .. inveator-oriented 
£ir:111a, thia concluaion haa 11\aJor implicat.iona £or all partiea 
involved with or evaluating cooperativea. Cooperative •embers-
patrona, boarda 0£ direct.ora and management. could uae without. 
alt.erst.ion IFO £inancial and •anageaent criteria. Managell\ent. 
could uae IFO management. deciaion rulea. However, me111ber-pat.rons 
may queat.ion value 0£ cooperative •e•berahip i£ the expectation 
ia £or cooperat.ivea t.o have the same pricea and out.put. levels as 
IFO. 1£ cooperatives are not. di££erent. £roll\ IFOs, society may 
queat.ion t.he validity 0£ ant.it.rust., t.ax and other legal exemption 
granted t.o cooperat.ivea. 
How do supply cooperat.ivea di££ er £rom proceasing 
cooperatives? The maJor di££erence is that supply cooperatives 
are concerned wit.h t.he minimi:zat.ion 0£ product. price £or their 
mell\berahip, while proceaaing cooperatives are concerned wit.h 
maxi111i:zat.ion 0£ product. price. Do theae two typea 0£ 
organizations di££er ih their application 0£ decision rules and 
their per£or111ance relative to IFOs in apeci£ic market. at.ruct.ures? 
Cooperatives involve t.he pursuit. 0£ individual obJectives 
through group act.ion. Becauae t.he owner ia a user 0£ the 
organization, con£lict.s develop within cooperatives t.hat. do not 
exiat. in IFOa. Should a cooperative provide service t.o it.a 
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•e•berahipa or heve e high return on inveat•ent? Are there 
incentivea £or cooperativea to li•it ae•berahip i.e. not heve 
open •e•berahip? Are there incentivea to treet•ent •e•bera and 
nonaeabera di££erently? 
incentivea? 
What are the iaplicationa 0£ theae 
SECTION I: COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC THEORY: WHY AND WHEN 
Why Bother with Theory? 
Theory £orcea diacipline into the agru•enta about what will 
be the conduct and per£or•ance 0£ cooperativea. Frequently 
iaauea becoae clouded with aaaertiona, which are not conaiatent 
with the aaauaptiona aade by advocatea. 
cooperative principlea repreaent aaaertiona 
about how a cooperative "ahould'' operate. Meaber-patrona, boarda 
0£ directora and management are concerned about the iaplicationa 
0£ theae principlea to the operation and per£or•ance 0£ the 
cooperative. 1£ cooperativea are going to be managed e££ectively 
there muat be clarity in expectationa concerning ita operation 
and per£or•ance. 
needed clarity. 
Hope£ully, theory can aaaiat in providing the 
Cooperative theoriea ere uaed in model building. The 
computer haa brought about a •aJor revolution in the aathematical 
•odeling 0£ £irm and induatry deciaiona. To build theae modela 
there auat be theoriea 0£ behavior and apeci£ication 0£ the 
obJectivea being puraued. The lack 0£ a coherent underatanding 
0£ cooperative theory haapera the developaent 0£ aodela that can 
be uaed aa an aid in deciaion making. The theoriea auat be 
underatood ao model uaera underatand the inherent atrengtha and 
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weakneaaea 0£ apeci£ic aodela. 
For exaaple, cooperativea operate in a legal environaent, 
which atipulatea apeci£ic reatrictiona or exeaptiona di££erent 
£ro• other legal entitiea. Cooperative& are required by law to 
pay 20 percent 0£ their allocated patronage re£unda in caah. 
What would be the i•plicationa £or cooperativea i£ the governaent 
wanted to increaae the percentage to 50 percent? To anawer the 
queation adequately aome £or• 0£ cooperative theory would have to 
be applied. Cobia et. al. in their analyaia 0£ equity redeaption 
provide an excellent example 0£ how cooperative theory, 
cooperative principlea and modeling can be combined to provide 
uae£ul in£ormation £or management deciaiona. 
A Caveat about Econo•ic Theory 
Economic theoriea have been aaid to only be aa good aa what 
ia put into them. Theoriea are baaed upon aaauaptiona. 
Deductive logic ia uaed to derive concluaiona £rom the 
The derived concluaiona are tautological and 
re£lect the aaaumptiona made. The reader ia encouraged to 
identi£y the crucial aaaumptiona 0£ the modela analyzed. By 
knowing the aaaumptiona 0£ varioua modela, a determin~tion can be 
made 0£ the weakneaaea and atrengtha 0£ a model, 
application to actual aituationa. 
A Brie£ Hiatory 0£ Cooperative Theory 
plua ita 
Although cooperativea have exiated in U.S. agriculture £or 
over a century, £ormal economic theoriea 0£ cooperativea have 
largely been developed aince the 1940'a <Vitaliano, 1978). The 
economic modela uaed today are largely baaed on theoretical 
developmenta that happened a£ter World War II. Theae econo•iata 
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conaidered cooperativea to a be a apecial caae 0£ the theory 0£ 
the f'irJI\. 
£irm level 
cooperativea. 
During the 1950>a Hel•berger and Hooa developed the 
model that ia £requently uaed to analyze proceaaing 
In aubequent literature, attention waa directed to 
altering the aaau•ptiona 0£ the baaic modela to diacuaa apeci£ic 
iaauea au ch aa open veraua cloaed •e•berahip <Youde and 
Hel:mberger>. 
Aa cooperative theory developed, the perception 0£ 
cooperativea aa being an inatruaent 0£ aocial re£orm and having 
alturiatic meabera waa increaaingly queationed. Recognition waa 
given to the £act that although cooperativea Jl\ay be £or•ed to 
increaae the well-being 0£ a group 0£ individuala, individuala 
will engage in behavior that aervea their own ael£-intereat 
<Lopez and Spreen). How cooperativea coerce or encourage :membera 
to achieve group goala became a maJor 
evaluation of' cooperative per£or•ance. 
conaideration 
During the laat part 0£ the 1960>a and much of' the 
in the 
1970'a 
cooperative theory did not receive •uch attention by pro£eaaional 
econoJl\iate. <Care.on>. But during the 1980>a attention to 
cooperative theory again increaaed <Cavea and Peteraon; LeVay; 
Lopez and Spreen; Sexton; Staatz; Vitaliano; Zuaman>. Although 
the stimulus £or thia recent e££ort waa partially the need £or 
clarif'ication of' previoualy developed modela, the theoretical 
developments in game theory, public choice and the theory of' 
cluba provided new approachea £or analyzing cooperativea. 
Internal group decision proceaaea rather than the conduct and 
per£orJl\ance 0£ cooperativea in a apecif'ied market structure 
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The internal "politica" 0£ 
cooperativea waa no longer aaaumed away. 
SECTION I~: BASIC ECONOMIC MODELS OF COOPERATIVES 
Baaic Econo•ic Model 0£ e Proceaaing Cooperative 
Proceasin9 cooperativea have been uaed extensively by 
£armers to vertically integrate £orward into the marketing channel. 
The JUsti£icationa £or the £orJl\ation 0£ cooperatives range £rom 
the active abuae 0£ market power by other agribusinesaea to the 
£arJl\er~a desire to reduce risk and uncertainty in the £arJl\ing 
operation. Although JUSti£icat.ions Jl\ay exiat £or organizing a 
procesaing cooperative, at.tent.ion must. be directed t.owarda 
determining whether a cooperative can aCCOJl\pliah the 
organizational obJectivea established by the member-patrons. For 
example, how much will a cooperative pay £or member-patron 
production relative to that paid by an invest.or-owned business? 
The £allowing sections draws heavily £rom recently published 
research by Lopez and Spreen. 
Aaau•ptiona 0£ the Model 
Assume the processing cooperative being analyzed ia a sugar 
beet cooperative. The price paid to £ar•era is in dollars per 
ton. All £armers belonging to the cooperative have identical 
£arming operations and managment skilla. Also, these producers 
are attempting to maxiJl\ize net returns to their £arming 
operation. 
For the £arming operation, the traditional Jl\icroeconoJl\ic 
theory 0£ the £irm will apply in the analysis. The individual 
producer·' s supply curve is equal to the proportion 0£ the 
marginal coat. curve above the miniJl\um 0£ the average variable 
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cost curve. The aggregate supply curve £or sugar beet& to the 
cooperative equala the horizontal aummation 0£ the 
aupply curvea and ia indicated by t.he "S" on Figure 1. 
individual 
The cooperative aella augar and by-producta to generate 
the tot.al revenuea £or t.he buaineaa. The "cooperative aurplus•• 
available £or the distribution to the cooperative membera equals 
total revenuea minus total variable and total £ixed coata. All 
the membera market the identical quality 0£ augar beet.a to the 
cooperative and all producers receive the aame price £or their 
product. Thia price equala the average net revenue product 
<ARNP>, which equals the cooperative surplus divided by the total 
number 0£ tons marketed. 
Whet to Mexiaize? 
At this Juncture, a critical assumption must be made 
about the cooperative ~ a membership. Doea the membership assume 
the price received is a given or does the membership recognize 
the interdependence between the production level 0£ each member 
and the price received £or their product? 
Aaaume the cooperative 1 a membership perceives the price 
received aa being a given. Thia type 0£ membership could be 
described ea being "price takera", they do not £eel there ia 
any way t.o influence the price paid by the cooperative. Each . 
point along the ANRP curve indicatea the average price the 
producera would receive £or their augar beet.a £or a apeci£ied 
output level. There£ ore, the ANRP can be viewed aa the 
cooperative 1 a demand curve £or sugar beet production. 
The equilibrium point £or the cooperative and it.a member 
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FIGURE l: A CLOSED MEMBERSHIP PROCESSING CooPERATIVE WITH ANALYSIS OF A 
PRICE-TAKING VERSUS A Ccx:lRDINATED MEMBERSHIP. 
lliu.ARs 
PER pc 
TON 
pt 
~ 
~ ' 1 ANRP 
I ' 
1 MRP 
0 QC Qt Tons of 
Sugar Beets 
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patron a ia where the producera' aggregate aupply curve 
interaect.a the cooperative'a deaand curve. Thia equilibrium 
occura at point t. Producera would lack an economic incentive to 
alter their output level £roa Qt. At levela 0£ production beyond 
Qt, the marginal coat 0£ producing the additional output would 
exceed the price received. At production levela below Qt, the 
price would exceed the marginal coat. 0£ producing additional 
out.put and the individual producera can increaae their net 
incomea by increaaing their output. 
A Coordinated Meaberahip 
Aaaume producers underatand that. changea in total product.ion 
alter the price received. Because all producera are identical, 
the maximization 0£ cooperative aurplua wi ll alao maximize the 
per unit. ret.urna t.o the individual member. To maximize the 
cooperative aurplua, the marginal coat 0£ producing an additional 
ton 0£ augar beet.a muat be equal to the marginal revenuea 
generated £rom the aale 0£ sugar and by-product.a. The marginal 
revenue product curve, MRP, indicatea the additional cooperative 
aurplua generated reault.ing £rom procceaaing one additional ton 
0£ aurgar beet.a. 
Equilibrium under theae conditiona implies the cooperative 
would proceaa Qc and the price received would be Pc. Thia 
production level would be similar to that 0£ the investor-owned 
buaineaa, but producers selling to an inveator-owned buaineaa 
would receive a price 0£ only Pp. Such a production level would 
maxiaize the quaai-renta £or th~ cooperative meaberahip. Quaai-
rent.a equal the cooperative ' a net aavinga plua the contribution 
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to •eaber-patrona~£1xed coata. The area underneath the aupply 
curve ia the total variable coata £or the cooperative~a 
11\eJl\berahip. The area above the aupply curve indicated by caPcPa 
repreaenta the quaai-rent to the aeaberahip. 
Thia quaai-rent ia larger than what would happen 1£ 
producera were price takera. The price-taker quaai-rent ia only 
tPtPa. The reatriction 0£ output will reault in the loaa of" 
quaai-rent equal to the area tbc and a gain 0£ abPcPt. Becauae 
abPcPt ia greater than tbc, the ae•ber-patrona would be a net 
gainer i£ total tonnage waa reatricted to Qc. 
However, auch output level ia not atable. At Qc the 
marginal coat 0£ producing an addditional ton 0£ auger beeta ia 
only Pp, while the price received ia Pc. Producera have the 
incentive to increaae output becauae a pro£it can be aade by 
expanding output. I£ only one producer increaaea output and the 
cooperative accepta the additional output, ANRP will decline only 
&lightly ao it ia a pro£itable deciaion £or the individual to 
overproduce. However, i£ all the aeaber-patrona expand 
production they will eventually end up expending production to 
the price-taker level. 
Thia pointa to the maJor di££erence between cooperativea and 
inveator-owned buaineaaea. The inveator-owned buaineaa will 
11\axiaize the value of" the £ir• and reatrict the production level 
to Qc by paying a price 0£ Pp. However, a cooperative buaineaa 
can limit output becauae aeabera have an incentive to increaae 
production individually even though aa a group they •ay be better 
0££ to reatrict production. Thu a, one of" agruaenta in f"avor 0£ 
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cooperat.ivea ia that, i£ the •e•bera act aa price t.akera, 
proceaaing cooperat.ivea will expand product.ion and reduce exceaa 
pro£it.a in an induat.ry. 
En£orc•••nt o£ Coordination 
En£orceaent. 0£ output coordination can be acco•pliahed by two 
approachea. 
production 
product.ion 
One approach ia to have the governaent. reatrict. 
through regulation. Govern•ent regulation 0£ 
can be accomplished through marketing quotas, 
•arketing orders, grading ayatema and other £or•a 0£ govern•ent 
intervention. The aecond alternative ia to coordinate product.ion 
through production reatrictiona, education or apeci£ic pricing 
achemea <Lope:z and Spreen>. How can a cooperative uae the 
private sector alternative to coordinate output? 
For a proceaaing cooperative with a closed me•berahip, the 
moat direct way 0£ controlling production ia iaauing product.ion 
quotas to each member. I£ _ all producera were identical the quot.a 
would be equal £or all •e•bera. For het.erogeneoua •e•berahipa 
the marketing quot.as could be baaed on •arket.ing cert.i£icat.ea 
iaaued 
obtain 
by the cooperative or the nu•ber 0£ acrea planted. 
t.l)e desired level 0£ out.put. the tot.al number 
To 
0£ 
certi£icatea or acrea would be £ixed. The •e•berahip could then 
be allowed to buy and aell the li•ited nu•ber 0£ cert.i£icat.ea or 
acrea 0£ land. 
However, the •arket.able cert.i£icat.e approach cauaea a 
dile••a £or new cooperative •e•bera. The •arket certi£icat.ea will 
have a price det.er•ined by co•pet.it.ive bidding. 1£ the 
cooperative ia pro£itable and doea raiae •eaber patron pricea, 
the certi£icat.ea will have a poait.ive price. Aa producera bid 
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£or certi£icatea the bene£it 0£ •arketing to the cooperative will 
be capitalized into the certi£icate price. The bene£actora 0£ 
au ch supply control would be the initial ownera 0£ the 
certi£icatea,. while £or new •e•bera the certi£icate price would 
repreaent a coat £or 111arketing with the cooperative. A ai•ilar 
aituation would develop i£ a £ixed acreage baae waa uaed by the 
cooperative. The bene£ita 0£ cooperative meabarahip would be 
incorporated into the land price. 
A aecond atrategy £or keeping producera £roa overexpanding 
production ia to have the cooperative inatitute pentaltiea £or 
overproduction. The monetary pentaltiea would have to exceed or 
equal the quaai-renta gained £roa overproduction ao aa to enaure 
that auch production would be unpro£itable. 
A third atrategy ia to educate Jl\embera about the need £or 
cooperation to achieve apeci£ic goala. However,. education doea 
not eliminate the econoaic incentivea £or cheating by the 
111e111ber-patrona. The cooperative Jl\Uat have Jl\ethoda £or en£orcing 
di~ciplin~ upon tha production practicea 0£ the 
cooperative memberahip. 
.. enlightened .. 
A £inal strategy ia Jl\arginal coat pricing where the price ia 
aet at Pp and the cooperative allocate& the surplua under some 
arbitary criteria. The Pp price reaulta in producers not having 
any incentive to overproduce. But the cooperative will have to 
diatribute the exceaa baaed on aoJl\e criteria. The probleJI\ ia 
eatabliahing the criteria and having the Jl\eJl\berahip approve the 
criteria <Zuaman). I£ the criteria ia baaed on aoJl\e linkage to 
production,. the producera will again have an incentive to over 
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produce. 
Induatry LeYel I•plicetiona 
I£ exceaa pro£ita exiat in a competitive market atructure, 
cooperativea and inveator-owned buaineaaea will enter the 
induatry and expand ita capacity. Competitive equilibrium in the 
induatry will be achieved when ANRP = MRP =Pe <Figure 2). The 
cooperative and inveator-owned buaineaa will produce the aame 
level 0£ output and pay the aame price £or the producer output. 
Both typea 0£ £irma would be earning a normal pro£it and 
recovering total variable and £ixed costs. 
incentive to exit or enter the industry. 
There exiata no 
In a competitive industry structure the excessive pro£ita 
will eventually diaappear. There£ ore, the incentives £or 
cooperative memberahip would be expected to diasipate in the 
long-run. But aa previously diacuased, the )Uati£icationa £or 
cooperatives are much more extensive than simply the price paid 
£or a product. Agriculture ia a spatially dependent industry and 
there£ore the markets £or producta are regionalized. Marketa that 
appear to be competitive on a national baais may actually have 
local marketa with conaiderable market concentration. Alao, 
entry barriera into the industry or product di££erentiation may 
result in the exceaa pro£ita not being disaipated in the long-
run. 
Beaic Econo•ic Model o~ Supply CooperetiYea 
Farm supply cooperativea, rural electric cooperativea, rural 
water cooperativea, and the Farm Credit Syatem are all examplea 
0£ aupply cooperativea with which £armera do buaineaa. For thia 
chapter the ter,_ .. aupply cooperativea .. will be uaed to de£ine a 
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broad range 0£ cooperativea where •ember-patrona purchaae gooda 
and aervicea. 
Aaau•e the aupply cooperative operatea in a £ertilizer 
•arket where the deaand curve ia downward aloping. The 
cooperativea average total coat curve ia at ita 111ini111um to the 
le£t 0£ the deaand curve. The downward al oping de111and curve 
repreaenta the average revenue curve, AR, £or the cooperative. 
The aarginal revenue curve, MR, repreaenta the addition to total 
revenue reaulting £rom the aale 0£ one additional 
£ertilizer. 
The pro£it maximizing inveator-owned buaineaa would 
ton 0£ 
equate 
marginal coat and marginal revenue. The price charged would be Pm 
and quantity demanded Q111. The economic pro£it £or the £irm 
equala to di££erence between the £irm'a average revenue and 
average total coat curve multiplied by the quantity 111arketed. 
Poaaibl• Cooperetive ObJ•ctivea 
A nu•ber 0£ alternative obJectivea £or aupply cooperativea 
have been propoaed. The cooperative can atte•pt to maximize 
conaumer aurplua without having a loaa, maximize the total 
aurplua <conauaer aurplua plua cooperative aurplua> or 111ini•ize 
the net price paid by the 111e111ber-patrona £or 
<Vitaliano, 1983>. 
the product 
1£ the cooperative attempta to maximize conaumer aurplua 
without a loaa, the cooperative deciaion rule ia to equate ATC 
with AR. The Pate repreaenta a maJor reduction in the £ertilizer 
price and Qatc a •aJor increaae in the quantity deaanded. 
However, thia output and price level decreaaea the total 
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aurplua. Beyond the quantity Qac the marginal coat 0£ providing 
the product exceeda the gain in conauaer aurplua. Thia cauaea 
the cooperative 1 a aurplua to decline at a greater rate than what 
conauaer aurplua increaaea. The aeaber-patrona would incur a 
lower average total coat 0£ £ertilizer at thia lower level 0£ 
output where marginal coat equala average revenue 
Thia equilibrium level ia atable i£ the member-patrona do 
not anticipate receiving a patronage re£und £rom the cooperative. 
Then the marginal coat 0£ obtaining the additional ton 0£ 
£ertilizer will be equated with additional conaumer aurplua that 
would be gained £rom purchaaing the additional £ertilizer. 
However, i£ a patronage re£und ia anticipated by the member-
patrona the quantity demanded will depend upon the anticipated 
net price. Thia would reault in the cooperative 1 a actual aalea 
to move toward the maximization 0£ consumer aurplua without 
having a loaa. 
An Unatebl• Equilibriu• 
But what i£ the cooperative 1 a obJective ia to minimize the 
net price being charged? Aaaume the patron receivea a caah 
patronage re£und equal to the di££erence between the AR and ATC. 
The net price received would equal the price paid minua the 
patronage re£und. The miniaum net price occura when ATC ia at a 
minimum. Thia ia an unatable equilibrium £or the cooperative 
becauae the marginal coat 0£ aelling the additional £ertilizer to 
the patron ia leaa than the additional willingneaa 0£ the 
memberahip to pay. 
overbuy. 
The member-patron haa an incentive to 
What will member-patrona do i£ their obJective ia pricing 
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the product at the aini•u• ATC and the cooperative ia operating 
at a production level greater than ainiaua ATC. The economic 
incentive exiata £or a aubaet 0£ the cooperative~a •emberahip to 
£orm a cloaed meaberahip cooperative. By excluding part 0£ the 
1Reaberahip,, the cooperative can ahi£t the demand curve to the 
le£t. Stability would be achieved when the deaand curve 
interaecta the minimum 0£ the ATC curve <Figure 4>. Marginal coat 
and average coat pricing will give identical reaulta. There ia 
no incentive £or the patrona to ahi£t to other buaineaaea aince 
the cooperative ia achieving the •inimu• purchaae price £or the 
product. 
An alternative aolution may exiat. The cooperative may be 
able expand ita phyaical capacity and move the coat curvea to the 
le£t. Aaaume the larger level 0£ phyaical capacity reaulta in the 
cooperative achieving additional poaitive economiea 0£ acale. 
The cooperative would then be able to provide a lower net price 
than would be achieved operating at the minimum 0£. ATC £or the 
lower level 0£ phyaical capacity. cooperative would be able to 
achieve a lower net price. 
The £ormation 0£ coalitiona will be diacuaaed in the game 
theory aection 0£ the chapter. The underlying aaauaption 0£ thia 
analyaia waa that there were TOO MANY individuala wanting to do 
buaineaa with the cooperative. Sexton and other economiata have 
argued that cooperativea are £requently con£ronting the oppoaite 
prob le• inau££icient deaand to achieve the miniaum point on 
the ATC curve <Sexton 1983; Cotterill>. 
Declining Coat Induatriea 
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Sexton haa agrued that cooperativea aoaetiaea have not 
achieved the econo•iea o:f acale required to be operating in 
the decreaaing returna region o:f the buaineaa. Rather,. 
cooperativea are operating in the increaaing returna to acale 
region. What pricing atrategiea can the cooperative uae to 
operate in the increaaing returna to acale region? 
Proceaain9 Cooperative 
Aaaume a proceaaing cooperative aa previoualy diacuaaed,. 
where the aupply curve o:f the aeaberahip interaecta the ANRP 
curve to the le:ft o:f ita maximum <Figure 5>. I:f producera are 
price takera,. their output level will reault in S = ANRP or 
point t. At production levela below thia point producer& will 
have , an incentive to expand production <price> •arginal coata>,. 
while above thia point the price received :from the cooperative 
will be below •arginal coata. The coordinated equilibriu• ia at 
c with the average price bei'ng received by the producera being Pc 
and the quantity produced Qc. 
Where would the inveator-owned buaineaa operate? I:f the 
inveator-owned buaineaa atteapta to equate S and MRP, 
that can be o:f:fered to producera ia only Pc. 
the price 
I:f the inveator-owned :fir• o:f:fera a price o:f Pc, 
happena? Producera will aupply only Qi rather than Qc. 
inveator-owned :firm will then only have an ANRP 0£ Pi. 
impliea a loaa to the inveator-owned :firm becauae the per 
price :for the product Pc waa greater than Pi. Where will 
inveator-owner price the product? At the point where S = 
what 
The 
Thia 
unit 
the 
ANRP 
the proceaaor can obtain the neceaaary aupply £or the price 
o££ered and recover all coata. 
20 
FIRGURE 5: A CLOSED MEMBERSHIP PROCESSING CooPERATIVE OPERATING IN THE DECLINING 
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Coordinated Equilibriu• 
Again the coordinated equilibriu• by the cooperative 
111eaberahip at point. c ia unat.able. The aarginal coat.a of' 
producing the additional output ia greater than price received 
£or the product.. The cooperative muat. again reaort. t.o aome f'or• 
0£ internal control or aotivation techniquea. Thia ia neceaaary 
to obtain t.he product.ion required t.o achieve t.he higher price 
o££ered through coordination. The cooperative could have aupply 
quot.ea to inaure t.hat. t.here ia not. under product.ion or have 
monetary penalties £or underdeliveriea by producera. Again 
educational activit.iea could be undertaken but. aome f'ora of' 
diaciplinary action muat. exiat £or underproduction 
Spreen>. 
<Lopez and 
Another alt.ernat.ive ia t.o att.e•pt. t.o increaae aemberahip and 
there£ore ahif't the aupply curve to the right.. Voude and 
Hel•berger have argued that. memberahip would be expanded to the 
point where MRP = ANRP = S. Thia would be a at.able equilibrium 
£or the cooperative and pricea would be at their maximum f'or the 
producer if' S doea not continue to ahif't to the right. 
Theref'ore, a coordinated cooperative proceaaor will reault 
in producera increaaing their ouput level and price £or their 
COJllJl\Odity. From aociet.y ·• a viewpoint. economic ef'£iciency ia 
iaproved becauae the aarginal value product and aarginal coat.a 
are equated in the ayate•. 
The 
capacity. 
Supply Cooperetiv• end Declining Coata 
aupply cooperativea can alao have underutilized 
The exceaa capacity in t.he £arming and agribuaineaa 
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aectora in the 1980'a i•plied that the phyaical plenta 0£ 
inveator-owned and cooperative buaineaaea were not b•ing £ully 
utili2ed. 
Aaau•e the coat atructure and de•end atructure indicated by 
Figure 6. The coat atructure £or the £ir• ia auch that the point 
0£ •ini•u• average total coat ia not achieved at any de•end 
level. Marginal coat ia below average coat at all levela 0£ 
aalea. The two baaic cooperative pricing atrategiea are average 
coat or •arginel coat pricing. 
The inveator-owned £irm will meximi2e pro£it by producing 
where marginal coat equala aarginal revenue. The price charged 
will be P• with Qm being •erchandiaed. A £eeture 0£ thia analyia 
ia that the inveator-owned £ir• reaulta in the reatriction 0£ 
output and high pricea. 
the wel£are 0£ conaumera. 
The exerciaing 0£ market power reducea 
I£ the cooperative requirea that ATC = AR, The cooperative 
will be £ollowing en average coat pricing atrategy 0£ charging Pa 
and aelling Ca. The cooperative will reduce the deed weight loaa 
to conau•era equal to abde. Dead weight loaa re£era to the 
additional conaumer aurplua above marginal coata that would have 
been loat i£ the additional output had not been produced. The 
price reduction will alao reault in a maJor direct trena£er, 
edP•Patc, £rom the £ir• to the •e•ber-patron. 
However, Sexton haa egrued that marginal coat pricing ia 
auperior to average coat pricing <Sexton 1983>. The cooperative 
can increaae ita bene£ita by increaaing output to the point where 
the . MC curve interaecta the deaand curve at c. The area under 
the demand curve repreaenta the willingneaa to pay £or the 
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additional output, while the area under the •arginal coat curve 
indicatea the additional coat 0£ producing that output. 
reault ia a £urther reduction in deadweight loaa 0£ abc. 
The net 
Thia recoaaendation haa the problea that i£ the cooperative 
chargea only Pmc £or the product, that average revenuea will be 
leaa than average total coata. Thia impliea the cooperative will 
operate at a loaa and will eventually have to exit the induatry. 
Alternative £unding muat be £ound. Thia loaa haa to be made up 
with aome :form o:f membership :fee or £ixed £ee baaed on expected 
patronage. However, the appropriate allocation aethod •u~t not 
cause the me~bers to atop patronizing the cooperative. For 
example, high tranaaction coats may cauae thia di££iculty. 
Nonaeaber Buaineaa 
Another approach £or handling decreaaing return a ia :for 
processing and supply cooperativea to deal with non•embers <Lopez 
and Spreen>. By increaain·g the proceaaing and sales volumea, the 
cooperativea can lower the average total coat £or members • The 
Jl\aJOr question ia how much output. should be obtained :from 
nonmember a versus members? 
Again aasume the proceaaing cooperative ia operating in 
decreasing coat region <Figure 7>. The open market price :for 
non•ember product ia Po and assume the cooperative ia not large 
enough to in:fluence the open market. price £or the commodity. At 
0111 the cooperative ·' a member-patrons become a •ore expenaive 
source than the open market. The cooperative can add to the 
cooperative aurplus by purchasing :from nonmembera because MRP > 
Po. The cooperative would purchaae nonme•ber production until 
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FIGURE 7: A PROCESSING CooPERATIVE OPERATING IN THE DECLINING CosT REGION OF ITs 
CosT FUNCTION AND rtlNMEMBER SUPPLY ls AVAIL.ABLE. 
IbUARS 
PER 
TON 
0 
s 
I / , 
/ : 
I 
\ 
\ . 
' MRP 
26 
ANRP 
Tons of 
Sugar Beets 
MRP = Po. The quantity 0£ nonaeaber buaineaa purchaaed would 
equal Omtn •inua Oa. 
Treataent o~ Nonaeabera 
The analyaia aaauaea that the cooperative will diatribute 
the additional cooperative aurplua back to the meaberahip only. 
There£ore, the revenue the aeaber receivea per unit 0£ production 
will be higher than indicated by the ANRP curve. The maxiaum 
average revenue £or the •ember-patron in thia aituation will 
occur 
Even 
at the point when the cooperative aurplua ia at a maximum. 
i£ the cooperative haa to pay an incoae tax on nonaember 
buaineaa, thia optimal level will not be altered. 
I£ the cooperatve diatributea patronage re£unda to 
nonmember a aa well aa to membera, what would be the deciaion 
rule 0£ the cooperative? No doubt the board 0£ directora· would 
be intereated in maximizing the bene£ita 0£ the cooperative to 
ita aembera not nonmembera. The aeaberahip will be intereated in 
receiving the maximum ANRP per unit aarketed. Purcheaing 
additional output beyond Qe only reaulta in decreaaing the ANRP 
received by the cooperative member-patrona. 
Nonaeabera and Supply Cooperative• 
Supply cooperativea operating in the declining coat 
proportion 0£ their coat £unction alao have a coat incentive to 
expand the nonmember purchaaea. The expanaion 0£ purchaaea by 
nonmember a increaaea the total quantity aold and reducea the 
average total coat and marginal coat 0£ providing the product to 
aembera. I£ the cooperetive'a organizational obJective ia 
obtaining the minimum net price £or member, buaineaa 
will be expanded to the point, where average total coat achievea 
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ita •iniaua. The average coat pricing atrategy and •arginal coat 
atrategy would provide the aame equilibriu• <Figure 8>. 
However, 
in a manner, 
thia aaauaea that the cooperative ia not operated 
where potential pro£ita aaaociated with nonaeaber 
buaineaa are not trana£erred back to the meaberahip. Thia 
diacrimination between membera and nonmeabera will 
incentive 
proportion 
ayate• within the cooperative. The 
alter 
larger 
the 
the 
the 0£ buaineaa done with nonmembera, the greater 
the meJRbera to uae the nonaeJRber buaineaa aa a incentive 0£ 
pro£it center. Increasingly, the cooperative will operate like a 
pro£it maximizing £irm ea the non•e•ber buaineaa become a more 
ai9ni£icant proportion 0£ total revenues. Eisenat-at and Ma a son 
provide additional insighta in proceaaing cooperative conduct and 
per£ormance by examining the implicationa 0£ price diacrimination 
and additional market atructurea. 
Con aider the caae where a aupply cooperative ia operating 
in the declining portion 0£ the average total coat curve. The 
nonmemberahip demand £or the product ia not large enough £or the 
cooperative to achieve the miniaua 0£ the average total coat 
curve. !£ the average coat pricing ia £ollowed the price 
charged by the cooperative will decline to Pac~. 
The marginal coat pricing propoaal would imply a lowering 0£ . 
the price to Pmc~. The deadweight loaa gain £or the 111e111ber-
patrona would be o££aet by increaaea in total coata. However, 
the coat 0£ providing the aervice to the nonmembera above the 
price paid £or the aervice ia cde. The board 0£ directora and 
me•berahip are not going to be concerned about the gaina in 
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non111e111ber conau•er aurplua, ceg. In thia exa111ple, the average 
loaaea per unit that would have to be co•penaated f'or by the 
111e111bera would actually increaae with the expanded •eaberahip. 
The actual pricing atrategy of' the cooperative aembera would 
probably require that the expanaion in non•ember buaineaa at 
leaat doea not increaae the net price paid by the 111embera. In 
f'act, the memberahip will probably deaire that the cooperative 
price the additional product aold to maximize net returna, 
would ensure the lowest poaaible net price f'or •e111bera. 
thia 
The 
actual pricing decision ia dependent upon the cooperative~a coat, 
and me111ber and non111ember de111and characteriatica. 
Nonmember buaineaa motivatea cooperative to act 
increasingly like an inveator-owned busineaa in ita pricing 
policiea. 
ter111a of' 
There:fore, the aaserted aocietal wel:f are gaina in 
increased output and lower prices f'or conaumers are 
111itigated. The cooperative memberahip policiea muat be evaluated 
caref'ully <Youde~ Youde and Helmberger). 
Concluaiona About the Cooperative Meneg•••nt Puzzle 
The deciaion rulea that govern the 111anagement decisiona o:f 
inveator-owned buaineaaea are rather conadatent. The 
maxi111ization of' prof'it and the value of' the f'irm are generally 
accepted aa being the primary organizational goala. Thia lead a 
to basic decision rulea auch aa "•arginal coata equaling marginal 
revenuea." 
Cooperativea have conaiderable more 111ana9ement uncertainty 
in terma of' organizational obJectives and decisiona rulea. Open 
veraua closed memberahip, marginal coat veraua average coat 
pricing, and service veraua prof'ita are so•e of' the cauaea of' 
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•anage•ent. uncertainty. How do the board 0£ direct.ora, 
'l\anagera, and patron-ownera eat.abliah per£or•ance criteria £or a 
cooperative organization. The t.e•pt.ation £requent.ly ia to 
co•pare the £inancial per£ormance 0£ cooperative agribuaineaa to 
the £inancial per£ormance 0£ inveator-owned buaineaaea. Doe a 
theory give ua any guidance on thia iaaue? 
In a competitive induat.ry the expectation would be £or 
cooperat.ivea and inveator-owned buaineaaea to achieve eaaent.ially 
the aa•e level 0£ £inancial per£or•ance in the long-run. Both 
typea 0£ £irma ahould be earning a nor•al rate 0£ return on 
In long-run equilibriu• the inveator-owned and inveatment.. 
cooperative will both be operating at the point where 
MR=P=ATC=MC. The expectation would be £or aimilar per£oraence 
£ro• the organizat.iona. Compariaiona between cooperat.ivea and 
inveator-owned buaineaaea in eatabliahed co•pet.itive induatriea 
'l\ay be a JUati£iable practice. 
Where the iaaue becomea 'l\UCh more con£uaed ia in the ahort-
run diaequilibriuJI\ conditiona and other aberrationa that develop 
in the market place. For aupply cooperativea in 
induatriea with downward aloping de•and curvea and increaaing 
average tot.al coat atructure will •erchandiae producta at a lower 
price levela and greeter levela 0£ output than the inveator-owned 
£ir•. Thia impliea a lower rate 0£ £inancial return £or a aupply 
cooperative than competing inveator-owned buaineaaea. 
A proceaaing cooperative operating in the increaaing average 
total coat region and having a coordinated equilibriua would 
eat.abliah the level aa an inveator-owned 
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buaineaa. Yet manage••nt and the board o:f directora •ay receive 
preaaurea to liait aeaberahip to achieve the maxi•u• ANRP, A 
preaaure that will actually lower the :financial per:formance below 
the inveator-owned :firm • 
The deaired per:formance characteriatica o:f a cooperative are 
aa varied aa the buaineaa environmenta that exiat. 
patrona, boarda o:f directora and manager& ahould not expect 
cooperativea to have a aiaple preacriptive aet o:f rulea :for 
operation. The induatrial organization conaiderationa have maJor 
implication& on what ahould be expected o:f a cooperative in terma 
o:f per:foraance. 
SECTION III: IMPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY FOR ANALYSIS OF 
COOPERATIVE FIRMS 
Go•• Theory end Cooperotivea 
The previoualy diacuaaed econo•ic aodela did not attempt to 
analyze the internal choice proceaa o:f cooperativea. The 
reaulta o:f the internal deciaion proceaa were aaaumed to exiat--
the reaulta being apeci:fic cooperative obJectivea. However, group 
choice iaauea are receiving increaaed attention by cooperative 
•anagement·, boarda o:f directora and member-patrona. Aa the aize 
diatribution o:f :faraera becoaea more aayametric, cooperative& are 
under increaaing preaaure :from large :farmera to inatitute price 
diacount achedulea :for large volumea. Alao, 
increaaingly apecialized in apeci:fic co•aodity coaplexea with 
little diverai:fication. Large diverai:fied cooperativea have 
intenai:fied in:fighting among commodity groupa becauae the me•ber-
patrona~ ael:f-intereata have become leaa ho•ogeneoua. 
Game theory involvea the atudy o:f aituationa where two or 
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•ore •••bera 0£ a group are at leaat partially con£licting 
<Chiang>. The two •aJor ga•• categoriea are gaaea 0£ chance and 
ga•ea 0£ atrategy. A gene 0£ chance are ga•ea where no akill ia 
involved in the ga••· Ga•ea 0£ atrategy involve deliberate 
choice or a courae 0£ action which i•pliea apeci£ic outco•ea. 
The application 0£ ga•e theory to cooperativea involvea ga111ea 0£ 
atrategy. A co•prehenaive diacuaaion 0£ game theory and ita 
application to cooperativea ia not undertaken but rather a review 
0£ the baaic inaighta that have developed £rom recent reaearch 
conducted by Sexton and Staatz. Thoae intereated in 111ore 
apeci£ic applicationa 0£ game theory to cooperativea ahould read 
the re£erenced articlea by Staatz and Sexton. 
Cooperative Ga••• 
Many cooperative group choice deciaiona 
conceptualized aa being .. n-peraon cooperative ga•e. '' 
.. In the parlance 0£ ga111e theory, cooperative galftea are 
ga•ea in which playera are allowed to communicate and 
•ake binding co••itaenta with one another. The theory 
0£ cooperative gamea ia uaually uaed to model aituationa 
in which there are gaina £ro• Joint action by a potential 
coalition 0£ playera, but where the playera muat . 
bargain among the•aelvea about how the net bene£ita 
0£ the Joint action are to be ahared. Failure to 
to agree on an allocation 0£ net bene£ita a•ong playera 
preventa the coalition £ro• £or111in9 <Roth> ... 
<Staatz, p. 1085). 
be 
It ia important to note that aa the .. playera .. change in the ga•e, 
the traditional coalitiona may £ail. Given the rapid change in 
the atructure 0£ agriculture, a maJor concern to JR any 
cooperativea ia whether they can maintain the traditional 
coalitiona. 
Conaiderationa in Coat Allocation 
Coat allocation ia particularity i•portant to cooperativea 
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aa they achedulea baaed 
volume or deal with con£licta between coaaodity groupa within the 
cooperative. What are the baaic inaighta gained £roa gaae theory 
that can aaaiat in underatanding how cooperativea auat deal with 
theae iaauea? 
Aaaume a aupply cooperative ia atteapting to allocate the 
coata 0£ providing a apeci£ic service to aeaber-patrona. The 
cooperative ·'a member-patrona are heterogenoua in their coat and 
aize characteriatica. Alao, aaaume the £ollowing: 
<1> The total coata 0£ any coalition 0£ producera attempting 
to produce the aervice ia leaa than or equal coata 0£ 
producing the service individually. 
<2> The £armera have three choicea: <a> purchaaing the 
cooperative~a aervice, <b> purchasing the aervice £rom a 
competing £irm or <c> £orming a coalition 0£ diaaatis£ied 
producera to leave the cooperative. 
<3> The demand £or the aervice by one member-patron does not 
a££ect another member-patron·'a demand £or the aervice. 
<4> Soae 0£ the coata in producing the service are Joint coats, 
coata that cannot be allocated to aerving a apeci£ic member-
patron. 
Given theae aaaumptiona the board 0£ directors and management 
muat determine how to allocate the coata among the membership. 
The £eaaable allocation achemea may include all the cooperativea 
current aember-patrona or amaller coalitiona <Staatz). The 
poaaibility exiata that no £eaaable allocation acheme exiata. 1£ 
thia ia the caae the c~operative will be diaolved. 
Factor• A££ecting Coat Allocation 
What are aome 0£ the £actora that a££ect the allocation 
acheme selected by a board 0£ directors and management? Because 
bargaining involvea uncertainty, coalitions 0£ members and aingle 
membera attempt in£luence t~e coat allocation by threats and 
counterthreata. In evaluating the validity 0£ thia poaturing by 
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the ae•berahip, at.tent.ion •uat. be directed t.owarda identi£ication 
0£: (1) How the coat.a 0£ the other membera are a££ected 
coalition or e.ingle meaber exit.a £ro• the cooperative? 
What are the coats. to the coalition or aingle member 
at.tempt t.o obtain the aervice outaide the cooperative? 
and 
i£ 
i£ a 
(2) 
they 
Con aider the price discount iaaue and aaaume large £armers. 
represent. a 
cooperative. 
maJor proportion 0£ the buaineaa volume 0£ a local 
The withdrawal 0£ their buaineaa impliea a maJor 
reduction in buainee.a volume. !£ the cooperative ia operating in 
the increasing average total coat region, the cooperative may 
actually move closer to ainimum average total coat. The threat. 
0£ withdrawal ia not a maJor concern to the smaller members. But 
i£ the cooperative ia operating in the declining coat. region 0£ 
t.he average total coat curve, the loaa 0£ a maJor proportion 0£ 
the buaineaa volume represent.a a threat. to smaller 
producers in terrna 0£ higher average total coats • 
. Another £eature 0£ the larger £armer or a coalition 0£ 
larger £armers ia the ability to achieve the economies 0£ scale 
in the provision 0£ the service. Alao, their business volume 
will be attractive to other agribuaineaaea. The expectation 
would be £or the larger £araera to have relatively lower coats i£ 
they exit £rom the cooperative. Because 0£ their abilities to 
a££ect. the coat.a 0£ other members and establish 
coalit.iona, 
poe.it.ion. 
larger £armers have a relatively at.rang 
lower coat 
bargaining 
The aaymrnetry 0£ £arm aize alao increaaea the uncertainties 
involving the bargaining proceaa. !£ a cooperative haa a 
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relative·ly hoaogeneoua aeaberahip,. the atrength 0£ apeci£ic 
coalitiona will be better known • Boerd aeabera end menageaent. 
will have a £airly reeliatic perapect.ive 0£ the eat.iaat.ed coata 
0£ ae•bera exiting £roa the cooperative. With e heterogeneoua 
•e•berahip,. the actuel atrength 0£ the bargaining poaition 0£ a 
apeci£ic coalition probably ia aore di££icult to diacern. 
The board meabera and •anageaent are leaa likely to be 
knowledgeable 0£ the actual at.rengt.h 0£ a apeci£ic coalition. 
Cooperative Inatability 
Aa waa diacuaaed earlier in the paper,. cooperat.ivea 
operating beyond minimua average total coat can be politically 
unat.able. Why? The baaic reaaon ia that a coalition 0£ 
melftberahip can lower their coata below that 0£ having the 
cooperative operate at higher levela 0£ product.ion. 1£ 
cooperat.ivea are operating in regiona beyond •ini•u• ATC,. the 
inatabilit.y will develop. 
Thia problem alao con£ront.a diverai£ied cooperat.ivea,. i£ 
aoae diviaiona are pro£it.able and ot.hera are not.. I£ the ae111bera 
patronizing the pro£it.able diviaiona are not. patron 0£ the 
unpro£ i tab.le diviaiona,. internal con£licta will develop. 
Advocacy 0£ get.ting rid 0£ the unpro£it.able diviaiona or £orming 
a new aore pro£itable cooperative may develop. However,. 
o££aet.ting the atrat.egy ia the £act that there may be coat 
aavinga aaaocated with the diverai£ied cooperative in buaineaa 
£unction areaa auch aa £inance or marketing. 
Fairneaa 0£ Allocation 
With the induat.rial organization modela,. there exiated the 
ability to identi£y apeci£ic pointa 0£ equilibriua. Within the 
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ga•e theory aodela, recognition ia given to the £act that a large 
nuaber 0£ £eaaible coat allocation• aey exiat. The board 0£ 
director and aanageaent deciaiona on coat allocation will involve 
a degree 0£ arbitarineaa. Concepta 0£ £airneaa, ael£-intereat or 
cooperative principlea aay provide guidance to deciaion aakera in 
the aelection 0£ the coat allocation. 
Changing th• Ge•• 
Cooperative manageaent, boarda 0£ directora, and member-
patrona all have the potential £or changing the inatitution rulea 
governing the cooperativea. Management can change operating 
procedurea and policiea. Boarda 0£ directora can alter board 
policiea governing managment. 
and articlea 0£ incorporation. 
Member-patrona can alter by-lawa 
Cooperative lawa can be altered ao to a££ect the bargaining 
power 0£ apeci£ic coalitiona. in the paat many 
atatea required a two-thirda vote 0£ the memberahip to have a 
cooperative merger approved. Becauae 0£ the di££icultiea 
involved in developing memberahip coalitiona in £avor 0£ the 
merger a, a number 0£ atatea have recently paaaed lawa enabling 
cooperative mergera to be approved by one-hal£ 0£ the memberahip. 
Alterationa in voting ayatema a££ect the relative bargaining 
power 0£ apeci£ic coalitiona within cooperativea. 
The cooperative can alao direct attention towarda altering 
member perceptiona 0£ the pay - o££a aaaociated with a apeci£ic 
action or change the actual context 0£ the gaae. An alteration 0£ 
payo££a would be educational e££orta directed toward the 
nonprecuniary bene£ita 0£ cooperative aeaberahip or changing the 
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perceptiona about the relative i•portance 0£ ahort-run gaina 
veraua long-run gaina • The game context can be changed by tying 
varioua aervicea and activitiea into a package. 
Dyno•ic Morketa ond Future Theoriea 
The modela preaented implicitly aaaume atable marketa with 
£ixed technology. The cooperative theory diacuaaed waa the 
comparative atatica 0£ cooperativea and inveator-owned buaineaaea 
in atable buaineaa environment. The modela preaented implicitly 
aaaume atable marketa with £ixed technology. Not diacuaaed waa 
the ability 0£ cooperativea to compete in marketa with rapid 
ratea 0£ technological change or global competition. A 
£rontier 0£ cooperative theory will be analyaia 0£ potential 
deciaiona rulea £or cooperativea in unatable and global m~rketa. 
Accelerating ratea 0£ technological change make coalitiona more 
unatable and require ahorter inveatment payback perioda. The 
£uture role 0£ cooperativea will be highly dependent upon their 
ability to develop buaineaa atrategiea to e££ectively compete in 
marketa where technology will 
atrategy • 
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